Pigstink Amerifuk. ***** you yankfilth. And the Jew here below is a
typical Jew liar. There *will* be a draft. Good. I hope dw's son
gets his squealing head blown away. And Tony's kids. Filth. Sow
the wind..
Grantland
Force Structure
Oct 19, 2004
By George Friedman
Since it is clear that the war will continue regardless of the outcome
of the presidential election, it is time to focus on the single most
important strategic issue facing the United States: the size and
composition of the U.S. armed forces. Unless jihadist opposition
throughout the Islamic world ends suddenly, which is unlikely, the war
will continue for several years. The U.S. military, however, is in no
position to continue fighting the war with current forces --
particularly Army and Marine forces. Therefore, something has to give.
To be more precise, there will be a massive increase in the size of
the U.S. military in 2005.
In order to understand the cure, it is necessary to understand two
symptoms of an underlying disease. The disease was a fundamental
misunderstanding of the nature of warfare after the Cold War. During
the Cold War, the primary focus was on a global war with the Soviet
Union, particularly involving high intensity conflict on the North
German plain. Such a war required a large and balanced military,
including naval and air power and substantial ground forces tasked
globally.
It was understood that the end of the Cold War eliminated the
requirement for this model. However, the new model that emerged had
little to do with the reality the United States is experiencing today.
The core geopolitical assumption was that the United States no longer
faced the challenge of sustained ground combat in Eurasia. To American
thinking, the precondition for such combat was the existence of a
patron state -- the Soviet Union -- that would provide the wherewithal
for second- and third-rank countries or guerrilla warfare for extended
combat operations. No patron state, no extended combat operations.
This did not mean that the United States didn't expect to be engaged
in wars in Eurasia. Throughout the 1990s, there was a constant
deployment of forces. However, these deployments had three
characteristics:
1. They were narrowly focused on one country at a time.
2. Significant combat was expected to terminate quickly.
3. They were elective operations -- the United States could choose or
decline combat without affecting the national interest.
In sum, the United States controlled the scope, extent and tempo of
its operations. It expected to be able to do this permanently. Put
differently: The United States expected geographically confined
conflicts of short duration as and when it elected to engage.
This strategic perception contained two operational principles. The
first was the priority of technology over manpower. This has always
been a priority for U.S. forces in Eurasia, where technical force
multipliers alone made it possible for numerically inferior forces to
fight. However, during the 1990s, the focus on force multipliers
intensified overwhelmingly. Getting to the theater and defeating enemy
forces quickly became paramount considerations. Crises came and went
too rapidly to build up major ground forces, and the cost of major
ground deployments was too high to justify under most circumstances.
Kosovo was worth an air campaign. It was not worth a multi-divisional
armored assault. Therefore, the United States became focused on a
smaller ground force that was lighter and faster, and on the use of
power as an alternative to ground forces
Second, given the intermittent nature of U.S. involvement, U.S.
planners shifted from primary dependence on standing forces to much
increased dependence on Reserve and National Guard forces. For some
specialties now in high demand -- such as civil affairs -- the force
consisted almost entirely of reservists. That meant that in order to
bring the military to its minimal fighting capability, it had to begin
by mobilizing Reserve forces for extensive periods of time.
Defense planners simply did not foresee what was about to happen.
After Sept. 11, they found themselves in a war whose characteristics
were the exact opposite of what they expected to be dealing with
during the 1990s:
1. Rather than being narrowly focused one country at a time, the
United States found itself engaged in substantial combat in two
separate theaters of operation -- Afghanistan and Iraq -- as well as
in other theaters simultaneously.
2. Significant combat did not terminate quickly, but has become
open-ended, with new potential theaters of operation in the wings.
3. Operations have ceased to be elective -- assuming that they ever
were. First, Sept. 11 created a military challenge that the United
States could not decline. Second, whatever the wisdom of Iraq, it is
now a highly active theater that is not about to go away. Declining
combat is no longer an option, according to either U.S. President
George W. Bush or Sen. John Kerry.
The mix of technology to manpower, and the relationship between active
and Reserve forces are simply inappropriate to the war that is being
fought.
The Need for More Forces
There are three phases of U.S. warfare: deployment of forces,
destruction of enemy forces and occupation of enemy territory. U.S.
military doctrine developed in the 1990s assumed that the greatest
challenge was formed by the first two problems. In fact, as we have
learned in this war, the United States might well have solved the
first two problems, but it has not come to grips with the third. That
by itself is not a criticism. Pacification, counterinsurgency and
controlling the ground in a low-intensity conflict represent the
toughest problems faced by the U.S. military or any military.
At the same time, it is an area to which the United States has paid
the least attention. Occupation warfare is least amenable to
technological solutions. But it must be said that compared to force
projection and destruction, few technological efforts have been
devoted to occupational warfare. Therefore, the occupation of
countries has changed minimally over the past century. It requires the
presence of ground forces in a highly dispersed and exposed mode, in
numbers far in excess of those needed to defeat an enemy armored
force. In other words, the force that was needed to defeat the Iraqi
army is too small to pacify Iraq if there is substantial resistance.
When we add to this the fact that Iraq is far from the only theater of
operations the United States is or might be engaged in, it is obvious
that more forces are necessary.
The 1990s solution was to reach into the various Reserve components.
That is essentially what the war has been fought on since Sept. 11.
Each service has used reservists to fill out the force. The problem
with this strategy is that the Reserve force was recruited in the
1990s and agreed to serve based on the premises of the 1990s. Even
those premises proved disruptive, as reservists were called up for
multiple operations. However, just as the Pentagon did not anticipate
that it would be fighting a multi-theater, multi-divisional war in
Asia, its reservists did not expect to be continually called to
extended active duty.
Clearly, the reservists signed up for whatever was required. Equally
clearly, they did not expect what has happened. The Reserve consists
of older, experienced troops, skewed toward higher ranks. They also
tend to be heads of families, with children, mortgages and
responsibilities. Some own small businesses that will fail without
them. Others have bought homes they cannot pay for on military pay.
Defense planners, having few options, are ignoring these realities and
wreaking havoc in the lives of the reservists.
Therefore, the reservists will quit as soon as they can, as will
active-duty soldiers. The military can issue stop-loss orders,
essentially barring people from leaving the military. However, the
United States cannot win this war with a captive force that is not
being -- forget replenished -- expanded. The United States drew its
forces down during the 1990s, expecting a certain geopolitical
reality. A very different geopolitical reality exists. The
administration is essentially trying bludgeon a force designed for the
1990s into a force for the 2000s. It can work for a while, but not for
long. Within a year the United States will have an army that has
either been hollowed out by discharges, or in which an insufficient
force of men and women is being forced to carry the burden of a war
that is going to go on for a while.
During World War II, troops left home and did not to return for years.
This was mitigated by a sense of a universally shared fate. During
Vietnam, a profoundly unfair draft was partly compensated for by the
fact that a tour of duty took only one year and the draftees were out
in two. Not only was there deep resentment, but just about the time
the soldiers were getting good at their jobs, they went home.
The United States will expand its force, particularly its ground
forces. It cannot use a Vietnam-style draft because that draft failed
militarily -- it ruined effectiveness and unit cohesion. You cannot
train today's military specialties in a few months, and then deploy
troops to combat. The last thing needed in Iraq is cannon fodder. In
an extended war, you must have an extended and highly trained force.
You can simply take the force that already exists and force it to
continue to serve indefinitely, but that doesn't solve the expansion
problem. In fact, it makes it tougher to expand. You can have a
czarist conscription policy -- a number of people will be randomly
selected to serve for five, 10 or 20 years -- but that will go over
like a lead balloon.
Expanding the Force
The force must be expanded. It must contain people who understand the
commitment is extended and open-ended. It must contain people who will
be trained in some specialties for a year, and then be available for
deployment for years after that. The force must include young
officers, as well as enlisted men. And these will be people who can
readily get other civilian jobs. This cannot be a force of the failed.
One solution has been to substitute civilian contractors for soldiers.
This is not a bad solution for some jobs, and outsourcing of
semi-military specialties -- such as logistical services -- is as old
as the republic. It is usable as a force supplement, but not as the
force itself. The job of a soldier is to voluntarily put himself in
harm's way, submitting to the orders of his superiors. The job of the
contractor is to turn a profit. We find nothing shameful in this, but
the natures of the missions are not only different, they are in a
certain sense, at odds. Being a warrior and being a contractor are
simply different things.
Nevertheless, this is the United States and it is a commercial
republic. It is one thing to risk your life. It is another to emerge
impoverished from the experience. The soldier's job is to place
himself between home and war's desolation. It is the homeland's job to
reward a soldier for a job well done. It is the peculiarity and, to
us, the charm of the United States that soldiers will indeed give
their lives for their country out of patriotism -- but they expect
their country to pay them for the risk.
There is an unpleasant tradition in our country of paying soldiers
poorly. It is as if the United States intends to dare its troops to
serve. There is another side to this -- a hidden contempt by
businessmen and professionals toward those who would serve at that
kind of pay. We know that the children of wealthy businessmen and
professionals don't serve, but the deeper shame is the lack of respect
the elite has for those people who do. Part of it goes back to the
aristocratic tradition of the enlisted man as brute, but it also
extends to officers -- there is a feeling that if these men and woman
were any good, they would be selling bonds.
That is about to change with a vengeance. The United States will not
institute a draft. The children of the elite will not enlist. The
United States is going to lose its army in the coming year or so, or
will face a revolt of the exploited in the ranks -- men and women
trapped in commitments that are far more extensive than anyone
expected, and whose lives are being thereby ruined. But there is a war
on and it is not going to go away.
The United States will have to replace some of the existing force,
will have to compensate the remainder for staying on and will have to
induce others to join. These will be men and women prepared to
sacrifice their lives if need be, but not their financial futures. Nor
is it fair to expect them to do so. They will be fighting not only so
that others might live -- but also so that others can make a pile of
money while they serve.
No one wants a draftee on his flank, but those who will not serve must
surely pay and pay big time. The idea that a captain leading a company
in Iraq should make less than a successful professional in any other
field is absurd. The idea that a senior IT technician at a brokerage
or hospital should have a 401(k) while a sergeant working computers in
Baghdad has to put in 20 years before he sees a nickel in retirement
income, is obscene.
And, leaving moralism aside, it will not work. There is no way around
an expanded force and there is, therefore, no way around vastly
increased pay and benefits for the troops. This will mean either
higher taxes or cutbacks in other areas. However, those who don't
serve and don't send their children to serve are no longer going to be
able to simply count on being protected by the faceless "others."
There ain't no such thing as a free lunch -- and that goes for
national defense, as well.
Something healthy will come out of this. For a country that fights as
many wars as the United States does -- and it fights a lot of wars --
the idea that the profession of arms should be treated worse and paid
any less than professions like the law or medicine is absurd. Soldiers
do not deal with matters of less importance to Americans than lawyers
and doctors. In the past, it was possible to get soldiers on the
cheap. Those days are past. If the United States plans to have a
military in two years, it will have to pay for it.
.
|
|
| User: "Leigh_Bee" |
|
| Title: Re: Shadenfreude at the ruin of the ***** |
28 Oct 2004 06:13:26 PM |
|
|
(Grantland) wrote in message news:<417fbc18.157223415@ct-news.iafrica.com>...
Pigstink Amerifuk. ***** you yankfilth. And the Jew here below is a
typical Jew liar. There *will* be a draft. Good. I hope dw's son
gets his squealing head blown away. And Tony's kids. Filth. Sow
the wind..
Grantland
Oh dear nothing personal then?
Force Structure
Oct 19, 2004
By George Friedman
Since it is clear that the war will continue regardless of the outcome
of the presidential election, it is time to focus on the single most
important strategic issue facing the United States: the size and
composition of the U.S. armed forces. Unless jihadist opposition
throughout the Islamic world ends suddenly, which is unlikely, the war
will continue for several years. The U.S. military, however, is in no
position to continue fighting the war with current forces --
particularly Army and Marine forces. Therefore, something has to give.
To be more precise, there will be a massive increase in the size of
the U.S. military in 2005.
SNIP>
Something healthy will come out of this. For a country that fights as
many wars as the United States does -- and it fights a lot of wars --
the idea that the profession of arms should be treated worse and paid
any less than professions like the law or medicine is absurd. Soldiers
do not deal with matters of less importance to Americans than lawyers
and doctors. In the past, it was possible to get soldiers on the
cheap. Those days are past. If the United States plans to have a
military in two years, it will have to pay for it.
On the surface all looks rosy and peachy, but this is the period of
change, now with nearly 7 billion on the planet, and some old notions
of unending good fortune, something is stirring,
Firstly we have an initiative to democratise the planet, not an
ignoble cause, on the surface but it simply cannot be imposed, and
transparency and patience are what is called for here and a plan, not
a bumble in and make excuses later plan, but one made with a consensus
of the players.
Secondly we have a problem with the climate call it greenhouse, or
climatic cycle, however it seems bigger events and so far only storms
and floods, but drought and messing around in the food chain, can make
for some serious outcomes of the irrevocable variety.
Then of course we have the problem that we are not as powerful as we
would like to be, or that the imposed have an innate fear of our
invincibility.
After all we can take territory but can never hold it.
Oh well back to the garden!
LB
.
|
|
|
| User: "Grantland" |
|
| Title: Re: Shadenfreude at the ruin of the ***** |
28 Oct 2004 09:03:01 PM |
|
|
(Leigh_Bee) wrote:
mithril@iafrica.com (Grantland) wrote in message news:<417fbc18.157223415@ct-news.iafrica.com>...
Pigstink Amerifuk. ***** you yankfilth. And the Jew here below is a
typical Jew liar. There *will* be a draft. Good. I hope dw's son
gets his squealing head blown away. And Tony's kids. Filth. Sow
the wind..
Grantland
Oh dear nothing personal then?
beat it *****
Oh well back to the garden!
LB
bananas
.
|
|
|
| User: "Leigh_Bee" |
|
| Title: Re: Shadenfreude at the ruin of the ***** |
29 Oct 2004 04:31:04 PM |
|
|
Unable to pronounce BWANA, (Grantland) wrote in message news:<4181a48c.282267088@ct-news.iafrica.com>...
leigh8bee@optusnet.com.au (Leigh_Bee) wrote:
(Grantland) wrote in message news:<417fbc18.157223415@ct-news.iafrica.com>...
Pigstink Amerifuk. ***** you yankfilth. And the Jew here below is a
typical Jew liar. There *will* be a draft. Good. I hope dw's son
gets his squealing head blown away. And Tony's kids. Filth. Sow
the wind..
Grantland
Oh dear nothing personal then?
beat it *****
Have a problem with race or do you perhaps have a problem with
Imperialistic advance?
The following one is not going to be any better and even you in your
recluse will be chewing crow.
Oh well back to the garden!
LB
bananas
Did you know Bananas, are one of the markers, of dominant tribes
throughout Africa, all those with a staple of Bananas have dominance
over their fellow tribes.
Ach Pleez Daddy, don't let me see a Voortrekker.
LB
.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Related Articles |
|
|
