A plan to integrate the insecure world into the secure world with
police type forces, but would the result be endless war and a
centralized world order?
America declared a “war on terror” after September 11, 2001. This
phrase resonated with a fearful public feeling the need to lash out at
evil-doers. It also provided a marvelous sound bite for our
commander-in-chief. The only problem was that no one would ever be
able to figure out when that war was won. There was no enemy army to
vanquish, no foreign land to liberate. Now comes Thomas P. M. Barnett
with an answer to that question.
In his book The Pentagon's New Map, Dr. Barnett writes that we will
win the war on terror only when we expand the stable security “rule
set” of the world's functioning core into those areas that are
currently not a part of it. He argues that until that happens, there
will always be al Qaeda-like forces seeking some sort of “permanent
civilizational apartheid.” He further suggests that our enemy in this
war on terror is “neither a religion (Islam) nor a place (the Middle
East), but a condition--disconnectedness.”
In this fascinating new book, sub-titled War and Peace in the
Twenty-first Century, Barnett divides the world into a “functioning
core” and a “non-integrating gap.” The Core includes the globalized
world of the United States, Canada, Mexico, the European Union,
Russia, China, India, Japan, Australia and New Zealand, South Africa,
and much of South America. The essentially lawless Gap includes the
world's trouble spots, where instability and poverty have combined to
produce flash points requiring intervention. These areas include the
Middle East, the Balkans, central and southeast Asia, Africa, and dark
places in the Americas like Haiti and Colombia.
Barnett, a professor at the Naval War College, argues that different
rule sets are required for the different regions. He suggests that war
is unthinkable among states in the Core, because globalization has
tied them together so well that the mutual benefits of economic
success will block any overt combative actions. Military might will
only be necessary to expand the rule sets of the Core into the states
in the Gap.
In this theoretical construct, Barnett applauds the Bush wars in both
Afghanistan and Iraq, as necessary attempts to transfer failed states
from the Gap to the Core. He is quick to point out, however, that Bush
has scared other world leaders by not offering a vision of a future
worth creating. Further, he clearly sees that the Bush administration
jumped at drive-by regime change in hopes of speedy success, but with
little or no planning for the eventual transformation of the so-called
liberated societies.
The author argues against war within the context of war, as it is
currently practiced. Instead, what he advocates is “war within the
context of everything else.” Much like law enforcement practices in
the Core states, he envisions the use of force in the Gap as the
rightful act of society, protecting itself from those who choose not
to follow accepted rules. In fact, he even calls for the
reorganization of America's military into two new groupings, in more
of a police department paradigm.
One, the Leviathan force, would provide SWAT style capabilities, with
the power to strike into the Gap at a moment's notice and wipe out
rogue states or terrorist camps with ease. The other, the Sys Admin
force, would become the "cop on the beat" and stay behind to maintain
security and stability in these foreign lands until such time as new
Core-oriented states could be developed. In his world view, the United
States must take the lead in this endeavor, because only we have the
power to do so. He does not worry that there would be no exit strategy
because he sees no exit possible.
His description of the current state of the world is compelling, but
his plan for the future is a scary one in many ways. This book has
been described by other reviewers as “weird,” “strange,” and even
“Strangelovean.” Like many experts at major healthcare facilities, the
good doctor's diagnosis may be bang on the mark but his prescription
may kill the patient just as quickly as the disease would.
Like some heavily-armed Socrates, he would encourage discussion with
leaders in the Gap, but then follow discourse with destruction, if
significant disagreement remained. Or like a Mother Theresa with
missiles, he would raise the living standards of the poorest societies
by decimating their current governments and starting over. Even those
who support Barnett’s ideas will be troubled by major practical
roadblocks which are likely to inhibit any real-world implementation
of them.
In a recent email exchange, for example, I suggested to the author
that staffing, financial, and global partner issues would derail his
plans, even if his concepts were widely accepted. As shown in his
responses, he feels those issues “can be managed if the right
investment choices are made within a coherent strategic vision….”
Cochran: “It is implied in your remarks about long-term commitment and
‘no exit strategy’ that we will need a much larger force for a long
time to come. Since the military is straining at the moment to cope
with even today's workforce pressures, how will they ever be able to
do more without a draft? Sure, the Leviathan force could be
all-volunteer--the ‘best of the best,’ perhaps--but any large-scale
occupation or Sys Admin force will require a major build-up, won’t
it?"
Barnett: “Don’t believe the force needs to be bigger. Reserve
component is good example. Huge number of those people (which as whole
constitutes 40% of force) are trained for skills we will no longer use
(e.g., great number of artillery). We’ve got the people; the force is
simply imbalanced. Continued transformation of the warfighting force
makes it smaller and smaller; that which remains goes Sys Admin.
Seeding the Sys Admin force means we attract coalition partners for
the back-half work. Most militaries in the world are built for Sys
Admin work, not warfighting Leviathan stuff. Frankly, we can't find
anyone to play with us in Leviathan game anymore, save a few familiar
allies. Rest of the world, based on my talks with their militaries,
are quite attracted to the Sys Admin concept. Simply put, that force
will marry up with lotsa forces from other countries. In the end, not
a bigger force.”
Cochran: “If we are to ramp up to even greater strength with even
longer-term deployments, then even higher taxes will be necessary.
Bush is the only ‘war president’ who has refused to ask the American
people to participate. How can the military expand without more money?
And what politician will ever be brave enough to risk asking for it?”
Barnett: “People cost the biggest chunk of force. If not bigger, then
not more expensive.”
Cochran: “You speak of sending in a SWAT-like team to take out bad
actors like Kim Jong Il, but you don't really address how that would
come about. In fact, you appear to endorse use of some all-knowing
Rambo to pre-emptively kill off anyone who might try to block
‘progress.’ The Israelis use such tactics out of immediate fear for
their lives, but wouldn't wider 'routine' usage of such methods breed
more fear than security? If many of the Core nations condemn Israel's
actions, wouldn't they also condemn ours? Much like the Bush-generated
anti-Americanism of the past 15 months? How can globalization stay on
track, if the ties binding the Core are severely weakened?”
Barnett: “The list of countries with bad leaders to remove, as I note
in the book, is rather small. Once Core shows willingness and system
to achieve it, most will leave on own accord, so long as we let them
take their loot, like Charles Taylor in Liberia. It's all boundable,
and the demonstration effect of first successes drive the bandwagoning
effect on our side and enemy’s.”
In conclusion, Barnett is nonpartisan to a fault. He points out errors
of several administrations. Likewise, his views are likely to attract
negative comments from all sides. Liberals will decry the use of
American blood and treasure to solve problems overseas, especially
when areas like education, healthcare, and urban poverty cry out for
help at home. Conservatives will be concerned about creeping
“one-world” government and about investing American resources with no
immediate return in sight. Pentagon financial types will be outraged
at tampering with their hard-fought budgetary successes.
Barnett writes that he set out to find that happy ending of a future
worth creating. He describes today’s world with precision, but
stumbles, I believe, in showing how to get from here to there. This
book should be required reading, however, for all who are concerned
about our nation's future. Love the book or hate it, as you see fit,
but know what it says. This is a debate worth having.
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