Science > Prophecies-Of-Nostradamus > The view from the Washington Post (Uncle Wally does not necessarily endorse or agree to this rather belligerent viewpoint expressed in this Washington Post)
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22 Jun 2006 02:07:15 AM |
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The view from the Washington Post (Uncle Wally does not necessarily endorse or agree to this rather belligerent viewpoint expressed in this Washington Post) |
www.washingtonpost.com/
If Necessary, Strike and Destroy
North Korea Cannot Be Allowed to Test This Missile
By Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry
Thursday, June 22, 2006; Page A29
North Korean technicians are reportedly in the final stages of fueling
a long-range ballistic missile that some experts estimate can deliver a
deadly payload to the United States. The last time North Korea tested
such a missile, in 1998, it sent a shock wave around the world, but
especially to the United States and Japan, both of which North Korea
regards as archenemies. They recognized immediately that a missile of
this type makes no sense as a weapon unless it is intended for delivery
of a nuclear warhead.
A year later North Korea agreed to a moratorium on further launches,
which it upheld -- until now. But there is a critical difference
between now and 1998. Today North Korea openly boasts of its nuclear
deterrent, has obtained six to eight bombs' worth of plutonium since
2003 and is plunging ahead to make more in its Yongbyon reactor. The
six-party talks aimed at containing North Korea's weapons of mass
destruction have collapsed.
Should the United States allow a country openly hostile to it and armed
with nuclear weapons to perfect an intercontinental ballistic missile
capable of delivering nuclear weapons to U.S. soil? We believe not. The
Bush administration has unwisely ballyhooed the doctrine of
"preemption," which all previous presidents have sustained as an option
rather than a dogma. It has applied the doctrine to Iraq, where the
intelligence pointed to a threat from weapons of mass destruction that
was much smaller than the risk North Korea poses. (The actual threat
from Saddam Hussein was, we now know, even smaller than believed at the
time of the invasion.) But intervening before mortal threats to U.S.
security can develop is surely a prudent policy.
Therefore, if North Korea persists in its launch preparations, the
United States should immediately make clear its intention to strike and
destroy the North Korean Taepodong missile before it can be launched.
This could be accomplished, for example, by a cruise missile launched
from a submarine carrying a high-explosive warhead. The blast would be
similar to the one that killed terrorist leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in
Iraq. But the effect on the Taepodong would be devastating. The
multi-story, thin-skinned missile filled with high-energy fuel is
itself explosive -- the U.S. airstrike would puncture the missile and
probably cause it to explode. The carefully engineered test bed for
North Korea's nascent nuclear missile force would be destroyed, and its
attempt to retrogress to Cold War threats thwarted. There would be no
damage to North Korea outside the immediate vicinity of the missile
gantry.
The U.S. military has announced that it has placed some of the new
missile defense interceptors deployed in Alaska and California on
alert. In theory, the antiballistic missile system might succeed in
smashing into the Taepodong payload as it hurtled through space after
the missile booster burned out. But waiting until North Korea's ICBM is
launched to interdict it is risky. First, by the time the payload was
intercepted, North Korean engineers would already have obtained much of
the precious flight test data they are seeking, which they could use to
make a whole arsenal of missiles, hiding and protecting them from more
U.S. strikes in the maze of tunnels they have dug throughout their
mountainous country. Second, the U.S. defensive interceptor could reach
the target only if it was flying on a test trajectory that took it into
the range of the U.S. defense. Third, the U.S. system is unproven
against North Korean missiles and has had an uneven record in its
flight tests. A failed attempt at interception could undermine whatever
deterrent value our missile defense may have.
We should not conceal our determination to strike the Taepodong if
North Korea refuses to drain the fuel out and take it back to the
warehouse. When they learn of it, our South Korean allies will surely
not support this ultimatum -- indeed they will vigorously oppose it.
The United States should accordingly make clear to the North that the
South will play no role in the attack, which can be carried out
entirely with U.S. forces and without use of South Korean territory.
South Korea has worked hard to counter North Korea's 50-year menacing
of its own country, through both military defense and negotiations, and
the United States has stood with the South throughout. South Koreans
should understand that U.S. territory is now also being threatened, and
we must respond. Japan is likely to welcome the action but will also
not lend open support or assistance. China and Russia will be shocked
that North Korea's recklessness and the failure of the six-party talks
have brought things to such a pass, but they will not defend North
Korea.
In addition to warning our allies and partners of our determination to
take out the Taepodong before it can be launched, we should warn the
North Koreans. There is nothing they could do with such warning to
defend the bulky, vulnerable missile on its launch pad, but they could
evacuate personnel who might otherwise be harmed. The United States
should emphasize that the strike, if mounted, would not be an attack on
the entire country, or even its military, but only on the missile that
North Korea pledged not to launch -- one designed to carry nuclear
weapons. We should sharply warn North Korea against further escalation.
North Korea could respond to U.S. resolve by taking the drastic step of
threatening all-out war on the Korean Peninsula. But it is unlikely to
act on that threat. Why attack South Korea, which has been working to
improve North-South relations (sometimes at odds with the United
States) and which was openly opposing the U.S. action? An invasion of
South Korea would bring about the certain end of Kim Jong Il's regime
within a few bloody weeks of war, as surely he knows. Though war is
unlikely, it would be prudent for the United States to enhance
deterrence by introducing U.S. air and naval forces into the region at
the same time it made its threat to strike the Taepodong. If North
Korea opted for such a suicidal course, these extra forces would make
its defeat swifter and less costly in lives -- American, South Korean
and North Korean.
This is a hard measure for President Bush to take. It undoubtedly
carries risk. But the risk of continuing inaction in the face of North
Korea's race to threaten this country would be greater. Creative
diplomacy might have avoided the need to choose between these two
unattractive alternatives. Indeed, in earlier years the two of us were
directly involved in negotiations with North Korea, coupled with
military planning, to prevent just such an outcome. We believe
diplomacy might have precluded the current situation. But diplomacy has
failed, and we cannot sit by and let this deadly threat mature. A
successful Taepodong launch, unopposed by the United States, its
intended victim, would only embolden North Korea even further. The
result would be more nuclear warheads atop more and more missiles.
Ashton B. Carter was assistant secretary of defense under President
Bill Clinton and William J. Perry was secretary of defense. The
writers, who conducted the North Korea policy review while in
government, are now professors at Harvard and Stanford, respectively.
.
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| User: "Perseid" |
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| Title: Re: The view from the Washington Post (Uncle Wally does not necessarily endorse or agree to this rather belligerent viewpoint expressed in this Washington Post) |
22 Jun 2006 05:56:58 AM |
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"=?utf-8?B?
wr9Xb3JsZCBXYXIgSUlJIDIwMDYgLsK3OirCqMKoKjrCty4gIFtUaGUgTGFzdCAyMzAwIERheXNdL
sK3OirCqMKoKjrCty4g4pmlwq7ihKIuwrc6KsKowqgqOsK3Li7CtzoqwqjCqCo6wrcuICAuwrc6Ks
KowqgqOsK3Lg==?=" <stargatedecember2012@yahoo.ca> Spat the Words
www.washingtonpost.com/
If Necessary, Strike and Destroy
North Korea Cannot Be Allowed to Test This Missile
By Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry
Thursday, June 22, 2006; Page A29
North Korean technicians are reportedly in the final stages of fueling
a long-range ballistic missile that some experts estimate can deliver a
deadly payload to the United States. The last time North Korea tested
such a missile, in 1998, it sent a shock wave around the world, but
especially to the United States and Japan, both of which North Korea
regards as archenemies. They recognized immediately that a missile of
this type makes no sense as a weapon unless it is intended for delivery
of a nuclear warhead.
Nothing North Korea does makes any sense. The last time they
tested a 'ballistic missile' which splashed into the Pacific, they
were apparently trying to put it into orbit.
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| User: "" |
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| Title: Re: The view from the Washington Post (Uncle Wally does not necessarily endorse or agree to this rather belligerent viewpoint expressed in this Washington Post) |
22 Jun 2006 05:14:22 PM |
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Perseid wrote:
"=?utf-8?B?
wr9Xb3JsZCBXYXIgSUlJIDIwMDYgLsK3OirCqMKoKjrCty4gIFtUaGUgTGFzdCAyMzAwIERheXNdL
sK3OirCqMKoKjrCty4g4pmlwq7ihKIuwrc6KsKowqgqOsK3Li7CtzoqwqjCqCo6wrcuICAuwrc6Ks
KowqgqOsK3Lg==?=" <stargatedecember2012@yahoo.ca> Spat the Words
www.washingtonpost.com/
If Necessary, Strike and Destroy
North Korea Cannot Be Allowed to Test This Missile
By Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry
Thursday, June 22, 2006; Page A29
North Korean technicians are reportedly in the final stages of fueling
a long-range ballistic missile that some experts estimate can deliver a
deadly payload to the United States. The last time North Korea tested
such a missile, in 1998, it sent a shock wave around the world, but
especially to the United States and Japan, both of which North Korea
regards as archenemies. They recognized immediately that a missile of
this type makes no sense as a weapon unless it is intended for delivery
of a nuclear warhead.
Nothing North Korea does makes any sense. The last time they
tested a 'ballistic missile' which splashed into the Pacific, they
were apparently trying to put it into orbit.
That is what they thought about Reagan!
Bush would send them over the edge
LB
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