The Wrong Model Of War
By John B. Alexander, PhD
5-2-4
(John Alexander, an SR reader, is a retired US Army colonel, and
author of Winning The War (St. Martin's Press). He is an expert in
special operations, and an advisor on national security to the
government of Afghanistan.)
Casualties mount. Mistakes are compounded. Troops are frustrated.
Progress is made. Yet, success eludes us. The reason is quite simple.
We have the wrong model of war for the global war on terror in
general, and Iraq in particular.
From the beginning, the war on terror was defined improperly. Terror
is a tactic used in the conduct of conflict. Most frequently it is a
tool employed by weak forces against those with overwhelming
capability. It is impossible to wage war against tactics or means. In
order to win a war there must be a clearly defined adversary. And,
successful conclusion to conflict can only come when that adversary
acknowledges defeat.
Terrorism is an emotionally laden term, one that is used to brand
repugnant groups or individuals. Domestically the line between
criminal activity and terrorism is severely blurred. As an example,
Earth First, an environmental group that has repeatedly committed
criminal acts, has been denounced as a terrorist organization by news
commentators. PETA, an animal rights group, as well as several racial
and religious segregationist organizations, and even motorcycle gangs
have been painted with the same brush. Some of these people may be
criminals but label them as a terrorist detracts from combating our
real enemies. These examples, and others, clearly indicate that an
adversary cannot be identified by such an ill-defined term.
The war on terror is prosecuted selectively. The Maoist insurgents in
Nepal frequently employ terrorism but we pay no attention to that.
Nepal does not have oil, nor does it impact our national security.
Various African nations experience intertribal terrorism that
threatens their stability. This too is ignored, as Western Africa is
not on the current administration's agenda. Closer to home, terrorism
is endemic in Colombia and sporadically employed in other South
American countries. In response, we provide limited special operations
forces, primarily to assist in anemic drug interdiction missions.
Little is done to counter terrorism on that continent even though
there are clear indications of direct relationships between Islamic
terrorist groups in the Middle East and South America.
Since 9/11 there have been two significantly different wars waged, one
by America and its allies, and the other by Muslim fundamentalists.
Operation Enduring Freedom led to the displacement of al Qaeda
training centers, removal of the Taliban, and installation of a new
government in Kabul. Through the politically expedient means we bought
military assistance from disparate warlords and supported them with
high tech weaponry. However, it would be a serious misjudgment to
believe that the converted mujahideen were philosophically transformed
into proponents of democracy. They were only looking out for their own
self-interests, just as they have for centuries.
Larger numbers of American and British forces engaged in Operation
Iraqi Freedom leading to regime change in Iraq. However, even with
135,000 troops remaining on the ground, resistance to coalition
occupation continues, and it appears to be intensifying. Actions by
the Administration in attempting to rapidly install an Iraqi
government sympathetic to their wishes bear similarity to the
Vietnamization program when we hastened to get out of that conflict.
Astute observers know the proposed solution is inviable. Like Vietnam,
we proceed in an inappropriate attempt to eschew responsibility for
the consequences of the aftermath.
American officials brand any participant in these conflicts who is not
native to the area as a foreign terrorist. At issue is the
anachronistic concept of geographically defined war. Many countries
now in turmoil had their boundaries imposed by Europeans who divided
the world up for their own purposes. Their cartographers' total
disregarded for traditional ethnic groupings and societal affiliations
has exacerbated existing grievances and resulted in near constant
instability throughout several regions of the world. Yet, we cling
tenaciously to the failing nation-state construct and inject our
notion of sovereignty to legitimize the conflict.
Conversely, our adversaries are waging jihad, or holy war. Years
before the attacks on 11 September, 2001 Osama bin Laden had issued a
fatwa against all Americans and extolled Muslims to join him in
resisting Western intervention throughout the Middle East. He
frequently renews those pleas. Therefore, the perspective of our
adversaries is that jihadists are simply moving to the battle,
wherever that might be, and irrespective of boundaries with which they
never agreed. They view themselves as mujahideen, or holy fighters,
and therefore lawful combatants, not foreigners.
Progress and success are not the same. Daily there are reports about
the progress we are making in Iraq and Afghanistan. The reports sound
very similar to "the light at the end of the tunnel" comments so
prevalent three decades ago. In Vietnam we constantly made progress,
but in the end we lost the war.
The notion that making progress in Afghanistan and Iraq insures
success is unsound. For the past few decades the military has adopted
American business practices that encourage constant progress
reporting. Therefore, in post-combat environments it is natural that
they monitor and report the physical changes and quantifiable
improvements. From Iraq and Afghanistan they report the number of
schools that have been opened, the number of hospitals repaired, the
amount of electricity that is generated, the amount of food
distributed, and a host of other factors that can be measured
conveniently.
The basic assumption by our leaders is that if progress is being made,
we will be successful. As we are learning with ever increasing
American casualties, this logic is fatally flawed. It is a serious
mistake to confuse progress, demonstrated by counting material things,
and success. To be successful we must redefine the war so that it
clearly identifies a tangible adversary. Only then can everyone
understand the objectives and know when they have been achieved.
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| User: "Woodswun" |
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| Title: Re: The wrong model of war |
03 May 2004 06:12:26 PM |
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In article <rcdc90png6cthajtb0svks0lbat836e5uu@4ax.com>, wrote:
The Wrong Model Of War
By John B. Alexander, PhD
5-2-4
(John Alexander, an SR reader, is a retired US Army colonel, and
author of Winning The War (St. Martin's Press). He is an expert in
special operations, and an advisor on national security to the
government of Afghanistan.)
Casualties mount. Mistakes are compounded. Troops are frustrated.
Progress is made. Yet, success eludes us. The reason is quite simple.
We have the wrong model of war for the global war on terror in
general, and Iraq in particular.
Gee .... ya THINK?
99
Woods
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