Been there, done that
Talk of a U.S. strike on Iran is eerily reminiscent of the run-up to
the Iraq war.
By Zbigniew Brzezinski, Zbigniew Brzezinski was national security
advisor to President Carter from 1977 to 1981.
April 23, 2006
IRAN'S ANNOUNCEMENT that it has enriched a minute amount of uranium has
unleashed urgent calls for a preventive U.S. airstrike from the same
sources that earlier urged war on Iraq. If there is another terrorist
attack in the United States, you can bet your bottom dollar that there
also will be immediate charges that Iran was responsible in order to
generate public hysteria in favor of military action.
But there are four compelling reasons against a preventive air attack
on Iranian nuclear facilities:
First, in the absence of an imminent threat (and the Iranians are at
least several years away from having a nuclear arsenal), the attack
would be a unilateral act of war. If undertaken without a formal
congressional declaration of war, an attack would be unconstitutional
and merit the impeachment of the president. Similarly, if undertaken
without the sanction of the United Nations Security Council, either
alone by the United States or in complicity with Israel, it would stamp
the perpetrator(s) as an international outlaw(s).
Second, likely Iranian reactions would significantly compound ongoing
U.S. difficulties in Iraq and Afghanistan, perhaps precipitate new
violence by Hezbollah in Lebanon and possibly elsewhere, and in all
probability bog down the United States in regional violence for a
decade or more. Iran is a country of about 70 million people, and a
conflict with it would make the misadventure in Iraq look trivial.
Third, oil prices would climb steeply, especially if the Iranians were
to cut their production or seek to disrupt the flow of oil from the
nearby Saudi oil fields. The world economy would be severely affected,
and the United States would be blamed for it. Note that oil prices have
already shot above $70 per barrel, in part because of fears of a
U.S.-Iran clash.
Finally, the United States, in the wake of the attack, would become an
even more likely target of terrorism while reinforcing global
suspicions that U.S. support for Israel is in itself a major cause of
the rise of Islamic terrorism. The United States would become more
isolated and thus more vulnerable while prospects for an eventual
regional accommodation between Israel and its neighbors would be ever
more remote.
In short, an attack on Iran would be an act of political folly, setting
in motion a progressive upheaval in world affairs. With the U.S.
increasingly the object of widespread hostility, the era of American
preponderance could even come to a premature end. Although the United
States is clearly dominant in the world at the moment, it has neither
the power nor the domestic inclination to impose and then to sustain
its will in the face of protracted and costly resistance. That
certainly is the lesson taught by its experiences in Vietnam and Iraq.
Even if the United States is not planning an imminent military strike
on Iran, persistent hints by official spokesmen that "the military
option is on the table" impede the kind of negotiations that could make
that option unnecessary. Such threats are likely to unite Iranian
nationalists and Shiite fundamentalists because most Iranians are proud
of their nuclear program.
Military threats also reinforce growing international suspicions that
the U.S. might be deliberately encouraging greater Iranian
intransigence. Sadly, one has to wonder whether, in fact, such
suspicions may not be partly justified. How else to explain the current
U.S. "negotiating" stance: refusing to participate in the ongoing
negotiations with Iran and insisting on dealing only through proxies.
(That stands in sharp contrast with the simultaneous U.S. negotiations
with North Korea.)
The U.S. is already allocating funds for the destabilization of the
Iranian regime and reportedly sending Special Forces teams into Iran to
stir up non-Iranian ethnic minorities in order to fragment the Iranian
state (in the name of democratization!). And there are clearly people
in the Bush administration who do not wish for any negotiated solution,
abetted by outside drum-beaters for military action and egged on by
full-page ads hyping the Iranian threat.
There is unintended irony in a situation in which the outrageous
language of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (whose powers are
much more limited than his title implies) helps to justify threats by
administration figures, which in turn help Ahmadinejad to exploit his
intransigence further, gaining more fervent domestic support for
himself as well as for the Iranian nuclear program.
It is therefore high time for the administration to sober up and think
strategically, with a historic perspective and the U.S.
national interest primarily in mind. It's time to cool the rhetoric.
The United States should not be guided by emotions or a sense of a
religiously inspired mission. Nor should it lose sight of the fact that
deterrence has worked in U.S.-Soviet relations, in U.S.-Chinese
relations and in Indo-Pakistani relations.
Moreover, the notion floated by some who favor military action that
Tehran might someday just hand over the bomb to some terrorist
conveniently ignores the fact that doing so would be tantamount to
suicide for all of Iran because it would be a prime suspect, and
nuclear forensics would make it difficult to disguise the point of
origin.
It is true, however, that an eventual Iranian acquisition of nuclear
weapons would heighten tensions in the region and perhaps prompt
imitation by such countries as Saudi Arabia or Egypt. Israel, despite
its large nuclear arsenal, would feel less secure. Preventing Iranian
acquisition of nuclear weapons is, therefore, justified, but in seeking
that goal, the U.S. must bear in mind longer-run prospects for Iran's
political and social development.
Iran has the objective preconditions in terms of education, the place
of women in social affairs, and in social aspirations (especially of
the youth) to emulate in the foreseeable future the evolution of
Turkey. The mullahs are Iran's past, not its future; it is not in our
interest to engage in acts that help to reverse that sequence.
Serious negotiations require not only a patient engagement but also a
constructive atmosphere. Artificial deadlines, propounded most often by
those who do not wish the U.S. to negotiate in earnest, are
counterproductive. Name-calling and saber rattling, as well as a
refusal to even consider the other side's security concerns, can be
useful tactics only if the goal is to derail the negotiating process.
The United States should join Britain, France and Germany, as well as
perhaps Russia and China (both veto-casting U.N. Security Council
members), in direct negotiations with Iran, using the model of the
concurrent multilateral talks with North Korea. As it does with North
Korea, the U.S. also should simultaneously engage in bilateral talks
with Iran about security and financial issues of mutual concern.
It follows that the U.S. should be a signatory party to any quid pro
quo arrangements in the event of a satisfactory resolution of the
Iranian nuclear program and of regional security issues. At some point,
such talks could lead to a regional agreement for a nuclear
weapons-free zone in the Middle East - especially after the
conclusion of an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement - endorsed also
by all the Arab states of the region. At this stage, however, it would
be premature to inject that complicated issue into the negotiating
process with Iran.
For now, our choice is either to be stampeded into a reckless adventure
profoundly damaging to long-term U.S. national interests or to become
serious about giving negotiations with Iran a genuine chance. The
mullahs were on the skids several years ago but were given a new burst
of life by the intensifying confrontation with the United States. Our
strategic goal, pursued by real negotiations and not by posturing,
should be to separate Iranian nationalism from religious
fundamentalism.
Treating Iran with respect and within a historical perspective would
help to advance that objective. American policy should not be swayed by
the current contrived atmosphere of urgency ominously reminiscent of
what preceded the misguided intervention in Iraq.
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-op-brzezinski23apr23%2C0%2C3700317.story?coll=-news-comment-opinions
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