| Topic: |
Science > Prophecies-Of-Nostradamus |
| User: |
"The Court Fool" |
| Date: |
09 Apr 2005 12:18:12 PM |
| Object: |
Ukraine, U.S.: Cheap Democracy; Getting What You Pay For? |
"General deficit spending, [eminent domain is good :)!] the war in Iraq
and the devalued dollar have tightened Washington's purse strings such
that the Bush administration has needed to develop a less expensive
geopolitical strategy."
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Ukraine, U.S.: Cheap Democracy; Getting What You Pay For?
April 06, 2005 23 20 GMT
Summary
The administration of U.S. President George W. Bush has used Ukrainian
President Viktor Yushchenko's April 3-7 visit to the United States as
the most recent guinea pig to experiment with the United States' newest
geopolitical strategy -- "cheap democracy" -- for gaining and
projecting U.S. global influence, as opposed to previous policies of
supporting pro-U.S. authoritarian regimes. However, Yushchenko's
empty-handed return to Kiev -- at least through the eyes of Ukrainian
government officials, the public and the opposition -- could prove
detrimental to both the Ukrainian and U.S. governments.
Analysis
Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko's recent visit to the United
States has given the second Bush administration the opportunity to test
the idea of "cheap democracy," the United States' newest geopolitical
strategy of choice for projecting U.S. influence throughout the globe.
The cheap democracy strategy is the Bush administration's alternative
to Washington's previous policy of supporting pro-U.S. authoritarian
regimes. It uses commonalities shared by all democracies -- instead of
money -- as the generator of support for the United States.
As part of this new strategy, Bush signed no financial packages or
agreements with Yushchenko, sending his Ukrainian counterpart home
empty-handed from a financial point of view -- a move that has left
Ukrainian officials, the opposition, and the general public displeased.
This disappointment among the Ukrainian government and people will not
only create internal problems for Yushchenko, it could lead to Bush's
"cheap democracy" strategy backfiring in Ukraine.
Until recently, the United States has secured and maintained its
geopolitical influence by financially supporting pro-U.S. regimes.
Egypt, the longtime second largest U.S.-aid recipient, serves as a
prime example. From 1979, annual U.S. payments to Egypt in military aid
and economic assistance have averaged $2.1 billion. To date, the United
States has spent more than $50 billion dollars to keep the Egyptian
government a U.S. ally -- and mouthpiece -- in the Middle East. As the
numbers show, it does not take long for this funding strategy to add up
and become a noticeable financial burden.
General deficit spending, the war in Iraq and the devalued dollar have
tightened Washington's purse strings such that the Bush administration
has needed to develop a less expensive geopolitical strategy. Cheap
democracy satisfies this concern. It is based on economic cooperation
between countries through opening markets and investing in and sharing
technology with targeted nations. Ideally, this economic cooperation
then naturally leads to enhanced political cooperation between the
United States and the targeted country.
Bush's interactions with Yushchenko adhered to this new geopolitical
strategy, and Kiev does not appear satisfied with the results.
In 1999, not-so-U.S.-friendly Ukraine received roughly $1 billion from
the United States, making it the third-largest recipient of U.S. aid.
Aid to Ukraine has steadily decreased since, with the country receiving
less than $200 million in 2004. Ukrainian officials and opposition
figures were hoping Yushchenko's visit to Washington would result in
more aid for the country, according to sources in the Ukrainian
government. In the end, though, the only financial offerings made by
Washington -- an extra $45 million for the Chernobyl shelter project --
did not include a payment deadline or even official confirmation from
U.S. officials.
Given Washington's new strategic approach to geopolitics, Kiev knows
that, as a definite U.S. ally, it should not expect aid to resume its
peak levels. This prompts some Ukrainians to ponder the idea of using
Ukraine's political capital to pit U.S. interests against Russian
interests -- and thereby motivate Washington to increase aid.
Ukraine fared better, however, in terms of political support. Following
the cheap democracy strategy, Bush offered political support for
Ukraine's membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) and rapid
accession into NATO. Though Ukraine already has support from other
international players -- such as the European Union -- for its WTO
membership, Kiev still stands to benefit from the backing of the
world's premier geopolitical power. Support of Ukraine's WTO-membership
bid comes in addition to the administration's previous decision to lift
some existing barriers on select Ukrainian goods. However, some
Ukrainian businesses fear foreign goods' flooding in to domestic
markets and killing out domestic production, making WTO membership seem
undesirable.
Bush also promised to waive the application of the Jackson-Vanik
amendment -- a Cold War-era law from the 1970s forbidding normal trade
relations with countries that block Jewish emigration -- to Ukraine,
something not applicable to Russia or Ukraine since the Soviet Union's
collapse fourteen years ago.
Upon his return to Kiev, Yushchenko will have to give answers to a
disappointed Ukrainians who expected more financial gains. Sources say
that Yushchenko's fruitless -- from many Ukrainians' perspective --
visit to Washington already has created tensions among members within
Yushchenko's own government, not to mention among the opposition and
general public. If not addressed quickly, these tensions could create
social unrest or weaken the central government, potentially affecting
future political battles -- such as parliamentary elections in 2006 --
in turn decreasing support for a strong alliance with the United
States.
Ukrainian national interests -- and not the Bush administration --
likely will dictate how Yushchenko deals with his disappointed
colleagues, constituents and challengers. Ukraine's search for direct
financial support for its ailing economy could cause Kiev to question
its relationship with the United States -- especially since it likely
can find new partners offering more financial aid.
Though Russia exists as an option for Ukraine -- Moscow still remains
Kiev's top trading partner and energy supplier -- Ukraine most likely
will resist this option for now, given that lingering effects of the
"Orange Revolution." Germany is currently the most attractive Western
partner for Ukraine. It is Ukraine's second leading trade partner and
poured $536.6 million of indirect investment into Ukraine during the
first six months of 2004. France and Italy also remain potential
Western connections for Ukraine. Yushchenko already has solicited
leading energy firms from both countries -- Italy's Eni SpA and
France's Gaz de France -- to help operate Ukraine's gas pipelines.
Outside of Europe, the Japanese Bank of International Cooperation
agreed March 19 to lend Kiev $178 million at a 1.5 percent annual rate
for overhauling Kiev's Borispol Airport.
Ukraine has no shortage of options or political capital, and Kiev will
make full use of both of these assets while pursuing its national
interests. If the United States' cheap democracy falls short of
Ukrainian needs, Washington should not be surprised if Kiev looks for
cozy relations elsewhere.
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