Uzbekistan: Desperate Moves at a Turning Point
May 13, 2005 23 22 GMT
Summary
It is unclear whether the Uzbek city of Andijan is now under the
control of government forces, following reports that hundreds have died
as a result of the May 13 government crackdown on protesters. For the
regime of President Islam Karimov, this marks a turning point that
likely will lead to further tensions in the Fergana Valley as clan
struggles escalate and Karimov's leadership is increasingly threatened.
Analysis
On May 13, after armed civilians stormed the Andijan city prison and
took over the regional administration building in the city's main
square, security forces in armed personnel carriers surrounded roughly
2,000 protesters. In the morning, the forces opened fire at the
protesters, killing nine and wounding at least 34 others. Sources in
Andijan say negotiations then ensued between the government, led by
Interior Minister Zokirjon Almatov, and the leaders of the armed
demonstrators inside the building. (According to unsubstantiated
rumors, President Islam Karimov also participated in the negotiations.)
Almatov reportedly offered the leaders safe passage out of the country
to Osh, a city with a large Uzbek minority just across the border in
the Kyrgyz portion of the Fergana Valley, but the leaders refused the
offer. At one point, witnesses allege, the armed groups inside the
building attempted to leave with 10 captured policemen, some of whom
were injured, at which point the forces again opened fire at the crowd.
Residents of the city now report that hundreds lie dead in the square,
among them women and children. Though the government claims it has the
city under control, local journalists continue to report hearing
gunfire in the city center. It appears that Karimov, who had flown from
Tashkent to the Andijan airport with Almatov and other top security
officials to monitor the situation, gave the order to fire at the
crowd.
In reality, Karimov had little choice if he wanted to maintain the
government's control over the country. In the revolutions that occurred
in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, the unwillingness of the
authorities to fire at protesters only emboldened them and led to the
eventual removal from power of those countries' leaders. By
demonstrating that the government is willing to kill civilians to
maintain power, Karimov has drawn a line in the sand for all to see,
much like China did in 1989 in Tiananmen Square.
A key difference between the velvet revolutions and the events in
Andijan, however, is that the latter essentially constituted a
rebellion in which armed groups initiated the violence by directly
engaging government forces. Though the scale of the force used to end
the uprising may appear extreme, the government was largely forced into
a position where it had to use violence to maintain its legitimacy.
Failure to do so would have invited armed revolts elsewhere that could
have escalated into nationwide fighting.
The fact that an armed revolt has occurred in Andijan has not been lost
internationally on governments with an interest in the region. The
Russian government has said that the events in Andijan are an internal
affair and expressed its hope that the situation would calm down. The
U.S. government advised Tashkent to use restraint in Andijan and
implicitly criticized the leaders of the uprising by saying Uzbeks
should pursue more freedom peacefully.
Sources in the Uzbek Interior Ministry have confirmed Stratfor's
expectation that the uprising was the result of rivalry between Andijan
and larger Fergana Valley clans and the Samarkand-Tashkent clans led by
Karimov. The violence in Andijan was preceded by the trial of 23
wealthy entrepreneurs on trumped-up charges of membership in the banned
Akramiya Islamist group and the arrest of protesters demonstrating
against their detention.
Uzbek clans tend to be an intricate patchwork of legitimate
businessmen, mafia members or drug traffickers, regional political
officials and possibly reform-minded political activists as well as
Islamists. According to Interior Ministry sources, however, this
uprising was primarily a battle over assets that the government was
trying to confiscate. The 23 entrepreneurs had established a charity
that had so far donated $20,000 to local schools and social programs,
and it appears the government wanted to seize the charity's assets, in
addition to material belongings such as cars taken when the 23 were
arrested. The uprising was largely a message to Karimov and his clan
that they should keep their hands off the Andijan clan's assets.
Sources in the Interior Ministry believe the uprising could have in
part been orchestrated by the United States as a warning to Karimov
that he should step down or face more armed uprisings elsewhere in the
country. Though the United States has not supported armed groups and
tactics in recent regime-change efforts, it would be consistent with
U.S. tactics for Washington to try and win over disaffected clans and
elite groups in Uzbekistan and back them in an effort to unseat
Karimov, whom the United States would like to see replaced. Similar
tactics tipped the scales in Ukraine's Orange Revolution, when most of
the Ukrainian elite was persuaded to support Viktor Yushchenko.
Separately, Russian government sources say they believe Saudi security
services are more responsible for organizing the events, and that the
Saudis and Americans could have an agreement to try to install an
Islamist pro-Western government acceptable to both sides in Tashkent.
On May 12, Russian Federal Security Service Director Nikolai Patrushev
said U.S. and Saudi secret services are actively working through
nongovernmental organizations to achieve regime change in the former
Soviet Union.
In any event, Tashkent will have to explain the decision to fire at the
crowd. The government already is saying the uprising was staged by
criminals and felons and will likely stick to that explanation, though
Karimov might also blame unnamed foreign elements and Western political
influence in the region as a warning to them not to interfere.
Nonetheless, in the eyes of the Uzbek population, any lingering notions
that Karimov's authoritarianism is a necessary evil to confront
jihadist threats to the country will now vanish, which can be a useful
tool for those who would challenge him. Without any political
legitimacy, the only thing to keep Karimov in power now are the
security forces at his disposal, and he appears to have them under his
control. Karimov now will likely have to pursue the leaders of the
Andijan clan to demonstrate to the rest that armed rebellion will not
be tolerated.
He will moderate that response to some degree, however, since the
threat of annihilation would leave the Andijan clan with no choice but
all-out resistance that could spiral out of control and lead to mass
uprisings. Interior Ministry sources report that the attacks in Andijan
were likely a warning shot to the government (any foreign government
involvement aside) by the Andijan and broader Fergana Valley clans in
which Andijan leaders are prominent. They are capable of larger
attacks, and both sides know this. Tashkent then will probably go after
the armed individuals who participated in the attack and make examples
of them while trying to negotiate with clan leaders. He will try to
make peace with the Fergana clans if that is at all possible. In order
to do so, however, he will need to abandon some of his ambitions in the
region, and he may then run into trouble with his own clans.
The Samarkand-Tashkent clans that form Karimov's support base have been
making increasing demands for spoils and power in the last year. Rumors
abound that Karimov is ailing, and talk of succession is rife within
ruling circles. Karimov's supporters likely would not tolerate any
sharing of influence with rival Fergana clans even if he is willing to
make such a deal. Karimov, then, finds himself in a very difficult
position in which he most likely cannot satisfy both sides. Faced with
a choice, he likely will play it safe and opt to satisfy his own
supporters. Stratfor predicted at the end of 2004, when a large rally
struck the northern Fergana Valley city of Kokhand, that this exact
dilemma would lead Karimov to side with his own clans against those of
the Fergana and thereby cause further turmoil. Events in Andijan
support that conclusion. Since the same conditions remain, this trend
is likely to continue.
Tashkent will probably crack down even harder to restrict political
activity and the media in the country. Rightly or wrongly, Interior
Ministry sources report that Karimov thinks some foreign governments,
probably Saudi Arabia with indirect encouragement from Washington, have
helped organize the current rebellion on a strategic level and are
working to overthrow Karimov one way or another. The Uzbek government
suspicion is that they struck a deal to support a Fergana Valley
supraclan as a geopolitical tool to remove Karimov. In general, then,
the country is likely to further isolate itself from the outside world,
or at least the West, to limit potential foreign influences on its
domestic politics. Meanwhile, the clans in Fergana, and perhaps
elsewhere, could be gearing up for the next fight.
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