Who knew shopping would turn out to be so important?



 Science > Prophecies-Of-Nostradamus > Who knew shopping would turn out to be so important?

LINK TO THIS PAGE  


rating :  0   |  0


  Page 1 of 1
Topic: Science > Prophecies-Of-Nostradamus
User: "Definitely a sick minority..."
Date: 27 Feb 2006 12:16:38 PM
Object: Who knew shopping would turn out to be so important?
===================================================================
Who knew shopping would turn out to be so important?
Do you best to destroy America; shop at a big box today. And have a
***** you day.
===================================================================
Book Review: The Wal-Mart Effect
Filed under: Random
I just finished reading Charles Fishman's The Wal-Mart Effect, and
found it fascinating and disturbing. I admit to despising Wal-Mart: I
don't like companies who only innovate in making things cheaper,
without product innovation and/or without taking responsibility for
cutting prices in a responsible fashion (as, for example, Southwest
Airlines does).
Fishman writes a cogent, fair analysis of Wal-Mart and its effects on
its customers, suppliers, and cities/counties/etc. in which it
operates. He doesn't come across as a Wal-Mart fan, but nor does he
write as holy crusader against Wal-Mart (as I would be). Still,
Wal-Mart can't help but come out looking ugly in its devout, relentless
insistence on "Everyday low prices." It's not that Wal-Mart is an evil
machine, but rather, as Fishman notes, that its scale makes some of its
practices destructive, no matter how innocent they may have been in its
founding decades ago.
At some point, for example, a rigid insistence on lower costs means
suppliers must cut corners. Those corners may be the quality of their
products (as Fishman illustrates with Snapper lawn mowers), the quality
of the environment (Chilean salmon at $4.84/pound in part because of
the massive destruction of the Chilean oceanic waters), or the quality
of the lives of their suppliers (inhumane working conditions in
Bangladesh and elsewhere to produce Kathy Lee Gifford apparel). But you
can't forever squeeze costs without squeezing someone.
This "Wal-Mart effect" is just one reason that I don't like it when we
view open source as a commoditizing force. If all open source can do is
wring costs out of the system, then it is a paltry gift indeed. No,
open source is a way to refocus innovation, allowing us to innovate
closer to the customer's perceived value rather than reinventing
(company by company) the infrastructure of, say, a CRM system. Open
source is more efficient, or can be, without being blindly efficient,
in the way I believe Wal-Mart to be.
Anyway, here are some of the more interesting factoids/comments from
Fishman's excellent book:
At the end of 2000, Wal-Mart had 888 supercenters (up from 9 in 1990),
and was the number-one food retailer in the United States. So, the
company went from a "standing start" to first place in roughly 10
years. That's power. (3)
Every seven days more than one hundred million Americans shop at
Wal-Mart - one third of the country. Each year 93 percent of American
households shop at least once at Wal-Mart. Wal-Mart's sales in the
United States are equal to $2,060.36 spent there by every U.S.
household in the last year. (Wal-Mart's profit on that $2,060.36 was
just $75.00.) (6)
ExxonMobile, number-one on the Fortune 500 list, employs about 90,000
people worldwide; Wal-Mart employs 1.6 million. ExxonMobile is growing
by raising prices; Wal-Mart is growing despite lowering prices. (7)
Wal-Mart sells more by Saint Patrick's Day, March 17, than Target (its
closest competitor) sells all year. (7)
How does Wal-Mart do it? Not by focusing on profits, but rather on cost
containment. Relentlessly driving pennies out of the dollar: driving
jobs overseas (without much concern for how those jobs are fulfilled,
so long as the result is a lower cost), driving costs of its own
employees (locking them in its stores overnight, forcing them to work
overtime without pay, skimping on their wages and health insurance,
etc.), and driving its suppliers out of business.
For example, Wal-Mart has proved exceptionally adept at externalizing
costs to its suppliers. Wal-Mart "charges many of its vendors with
keeping product in stock on its shelves; Wal-Mart cascades data about
its sales out to its vendors...but it gives those vendors the
responsibility of analyzing those waves of data and reporting the
insights back to Wal-Mart." (94-95)
Does Wal-Mart create or kill jobs? Fishman reports: "While the entire
country (from 1997 to 2004) was adding 670,000 new retail jobs,
Wal-Mart was adding 480,000 jobs in the United States. More than 70
percent of all new retailing jobs in the United States in the last
seven years came just from the growth of Wal-Mart. The remaining new
retail jobs - 190,000 in the entire nation spread over seven years -
amount to just 540 new retail jobs in each state, each year...." (107)
Juxtapose this with manufacturing, and those lame Wal-Mart jobs look
even worse. During that same period of time, "U.S. manufacturing
jobs...fell by 3.1 million jobs, a loss of 37,000 factory jobs a month,
on average, for eighty-four straight months." (108) [Interesting
factoid from Fishman: the US now has more people working retail than in
manufacturing, a shift that happened in 2003. We truly are a consumer
nation.]
As Fishman says, "We find the abandonment of U.S. factories from
Georgia to Michigan unnerving; we find cheaper stuff on store shelves
addictive. And we don't connect the two." (108)
More: In the first year after a Wal-Mart opens, it adds 100 new jobs to
the typical U.S. county. Keep in mind that each Wal-Mart typically
employs 150-350 workers. Do the math: even as Wal-Mart opens, it puts
others out of business. That 100 new jobs? All Wal-Mart jobs. No one
else benefits. Then, in the years after Wal-Mart arrives, retail
employment falls gradually, so that five years after Wal-Mart's arrival
in a county, there are only a total of 50 new retail jobs. Add to this
the fact that unlike smaller competitors, Wal-Mart does its own
distribution, resulting in a net loss to a county of 20 wholesale jobs.
Five years after Wal-Mart moves in, a county has gained only 30 new
jobs. Wal-Mart is hardly a growth engine for any economy. (144)
On suppliers. "Companies doing 10 percent or less of their business
with Wal-Mart had operating profit margins of 12.7 percent. Companies
that become..."captive suppliers" to Wal-Mart - selling more than 25
percent of their goods to Wal-Mart - see their profit margin cut almost
in half, to 7.3 percent." (163)
Wal-Mart and poverty. Economists found that "once you control for
everything else, U.S. counties that had a Wal-Mart just before 1989, or
that added one during the decade, had higher poverty rates than
counties that were Wal-Mart free. In a county with at least one
Wal-Mart, poverty fell not to 10.7 percent but to 11 percent. The
difference - three tenths of a percentage point - looks trivial....But
it is not. In counties with a Wal-Mart, the rate of poverty fell 10
percent more slowly than it would have without a Wal-Mart during that
decade." (164)
Wal-Mart and groceries. "Part of the reason Wal-Mart can sell a salmon
fillet for $4.84 [It used to cost $5.00 or more for a quarter of a
pound of salmon] is that...'they don't internalize all the costs.'
Pollution ultimately costs money - to clean up, to prevent, to recover
from. But right now those costs aren't in the price of a pound of
Chilean salmon. Salmon-processing facilities that are run with as much
respect for the people as the hygeine of the fish also cost money - for
reasonable wages, for proper equipment, for enough workers to permit
breaks and days off. Right now those costs aren't in the price of a
pound of Chilean salmon, either." (179)
Workplace conditions. A recent lawsuit against Wal-Mart alleges that
Wal-Mart's low price guarantee and relentless insistence on squeezing
costs "makes it impossible for suppliers to comply with even the most
basic laws where they operate, including wage and hour laws." Yes,
Wal-Mart does a limited number of inspections of its suppliers for
safety/workplace conditions. 12,500 of them in 2004. "But only 8
percent of them were surprise inspections. That means 1,000 inspections
were unannounced, and 11,500 were scheduled in advanced. Still,
Wal-Mart reports, 9,900 of the inspections resulted in violations
serious enough to either suspend a factory or put it on notice. Even if
you presume that the 9,900 number includes every single surprise
inspection - that is, if you presume that every surprise inspection
resulted in uncovering serious violations - that leads to a remarkable
conclusion: 8,900 inspections of factories in 2004 revealed serious
violations in factories that knew in advance that Wal-Mart inspectors
were coming. if the code of conduct has to be signed by the factory
management, if it is posted on the factory wall, if the inspections are
scheduled with advance notice, and still thousands of Wal-Mart supplier
factories get a "yellow" or "red" rating...how seriously are the
factories really taking Wal-Mart's code of conduct?" And if those are
the conditions in the factories on a day when managers know Wal-Mart is
coming, what is life like on a typical day? (189-190)
"Wal-Mart sells $178,125 worth of stuff per employee.
Target sells $156,506 worth of stuff per employee.
Whole Foods sells $121,875 worth of stuff per employee.
As those numbers go down, the pleasurability of the shopping experience
goes up, and that's no accident....Wal-Mart is relentless at measuring
its own costs; it isn't so interested in measuring its customers' costs
[i.e., of waiting in line, finding shelves stocked and organized,
etc.]." (203)
Conflicted shoppers. a recent study uncovered four basic kinds of
Wal-Mart shoppers: champions (they love Wal-Mart and heavily promote
it), enthusiasts, conflicted ("Actively dislike Wal-Mart because of its
impact on communities, wages, and jobs"), and rejecters [me].
Shockingly, conflicted shoppers are "by a wide margin...the second most
frequent shoppers at the store [5.6 visits/month]...and they spend
nearly as much at Wal-Mart as the champions - $289 a month." (220)
The punchline. "[Wal-Mart's] dominance at both ends of the spectrum -
dominance across a huge range of merchandise and dominance of
geographic consumer markets - means that market capitalism is being
strangled with the kind of slow inexorability of a boa constrictor.
It's not free-market capitalism - Wal-Mart is running the market.
Choice is an illusion. Wal-Mart's suppliers can't consider themselves
serious players...unless they are doing business with Wal-Mart. Once
they are doing business with Wal-Mart, though, they are doing business
on Wal-Mart's terms because Wal-Mart already dominates whatever
business they're in....
[By way of example, t]he new P&G [formed by the merger of Procter &
Gamble and Gillette] will be number seventeen, or thereabouts, on the
Fortune 500 list in 2006. But remember: Wal-Mart isn't just P&G's
number-one customer; Wal-Mart is as big as P&G's next nine customers
combined. Cheerful discussions of partnerships notwithstanding,
Wal-Mart owns P&G's business." (234)
Bigness beyond Wal-Mart. "The five biggest public companies in the
United States - with sales of $1.1 trillion - account for 9 percent of
the economy. The top twenty companies account for 20 percent of the
economy. Those numbers are arresting, and they are moving in the
direction of increased concentration [as 10 and 20 years ago the top 30
companies accounted for 20 percent of the U.S. economy]....We don't
often talk about the concentration of corporate power, but it is almost
unfathomable that the men and women who run just twenty companies make
decisions every day that steer one fifth of the U.S. economy." (242)
Indeed.
Wal-Mart isn't just a store, or a huge company, or a phenomenon
anymore. Wal-Mart shapes where we shop, the products we buy, and the
prices we pay - even for those of us who never shop there. It reaches
deep inside the operations of the companines that supply it and changes
not only what they sell, but also changes how those products are
packaged and presented, what the lives of the factory workers who make
the products are like - it even sometimes changes the countries where
those factories are located. Wal-Mart reaches around the globe, shaping
the work and the lives of people who make toys in China, or raise
salmon in Chile, or sew shirts in Bangladesh, even though they may
never visit a Wal-Mart store in their lives.
Wal-mar has even changed the way we think about ourselves - as
shoppers, as consumers. Wal-mMart has changed our sense of quality, it
has changed our sense of what a good deal is. Wal-Mart's low prices
routinely reset our expectations about what all kinds of things should
cost....
The Wal-Mart effect touches the lives of literally every American every
day. Wal-Mart reshapes the economic life of the towns and cities where
it opens stores; it also reshapes the economic life of the United
States - a single company that steadily, silently, purposefully moves
the largest economy in history....
Who knew shopping would turn out to be so important?"
.

 

NEWER

pg.716     pg.544     pg.412     pg.311     pg.234     pg.175     pg.130     pg.96     pg.70     pg.50     pg.35     pg.24     pg.16     pg.10     pg.6     pg.3     pg.1

OLDER