No WMD's In Iraq?
By Douglas Hanson
AmericanThinker.com | April 7, 2004
It has become established conventional wisdom that “no stockpiles of WMD have
been discovered in Iraq.” But this reading of the evidence uncovered to date
is premature at best, and highly questionable. A closer look at the data, and
at the uses made of it, is essential for those who wish to understand the
genuine state of Iraq’s WMD threat at the time of Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Another Congressional committee hearing has come and gone for the head of the
hapless Iraqi Survey Group (ISG). Charles Duelfer has testified that he did
not know how much longer the weapons hunt might take, but that the "picture is
much more complicated than I anticipated going in." In addition, he also
figured out that pinning hopes on getting information from frightened Iraqi
scientists was probably not the best way to find the locations of all those WMD
stockpiles. (see my previous article Cased Not Closed: Iraq’s WMDs).
Despite contracting out for assistance in document exploitation last October,
only a small fraction of the seized documents have been analyzed. Keep in mind
that the ISG is largely composed of personnel from the CIA, State Department,
such as Duelfer, and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), such as the deputy,
Maj. Gen. Keith Dayton. These are the same organizations that are currently
getting raked over the coals for bureaucratic bungling of intelligence prior to
9-11.
In turn, the beleaguered agencies are deflecting this criticism to the
President and his national security advisors, by essentially complaining the
“devil made me do it.” In other words, their technical and tactical
incompetence and/or their motivation to embarrass the administration has
allowed the ISG to make proclamations about WMD stockpiles that minimize the
significance of their findings, or deliberately downplay and contradict the
findings of Coalition forces in the field. Such is the case with chemical
weapons (CW) precursors.
The anti-war left and the media continuously shift the goal posts about WMD
stockpiles. But what does the term “stockpile” mean for WMDs? One nuclear
bomb is not really a “stockpile,” but it would only take one, set off in an
American city or dropped on US forces in the field, to make everybody wake up
and smell the coffee.
What did we expect to find in Iraq, the equivalent of the Pantex Plant? In
fact, we did find hundreds of metric tons of yellowcake and low-enriched
uranium. But I digress.
“Stockpiles” of biological weapons? A stockpile of bio-weapons can be kept
in a fridge in a scientist’s house. Ricin and botulinum toxin have already
been found in sufficient quantities to regenerate a biological weapon (BW)
capability in short order. No, the standard established by the left and their
allies in the media is that we must find chemical weapons (CW). That is, if
the US has not found pallets of CW projectiles in ammo dumps or munitions
factories or at Iraqi Army unit areas, well then that George Bush flat-out lied
to us. In a fashion, the critics are correct concerning CW stockpiles.
Here’s why.
Chemical weapons are very potent in small amounts in a sterile setting. Hence,
the bit in movies where the leading man dips a pen into a glass of water and
says something to the effect that “these few drops of nerve agent are enough
to wipe out hundreds of thousands of people” is correct, but only if those
people are crammed into the Silverdome. Chemical weapons have very important
weaknesses: They can be destroyed by light, heat, water, and wind -- that is,
the weather -- not to mention the heat from the explosive charge designed to
disperse the agent. It is for this reason that CWs are employed en masse with
strict targeting protocols, when attacking an army in the field.
Even if done properly, depending upon the equipment and training of your
adversary, the killing and incapacitating effects may not be tactically
significant. For these reasons, Saddam initially “tested” his CW on
unsuspecting Kurd civilians to gain an accurate medical picture of chemical
agent effects. Simply put, anyone contemplating use of CW needs a lot of it,
and it must be delivered at the right time and place.
UNSCOM inspectors understood these factors when they concluded in 1995 that, at
the time of Operation Desert Storm in January of 1991, Iraq had largely solved
key technical issues. The problem of precursor storage and stabilization for
VX, a powerful and persistent nerve agent was solved by Saddam’s scientists.
In addition, UNSCOM noted the development of prototypes for binary sarin
(non-persistent nerve agent) artillery shells and 122mm rockets. Binary rounds
consist of two non-lethal substances that combine upon detonation to form a
lethal agent.
The technically advanced binary nature of these projectiles was amazing enough,
but they also had developed “quantities well beyond the prototype levels.”
The DIA concurred with UNSCOM that Iraq had retained production equipment and
chemical precursors to reconstitute a CW program absent an inspection regime.
Specifically, the DIA noted that Baghdad had rebuilt segments of its industrial
chemical infrastructure under the “guise of a civilian need for pesticides,
chlorine, and other legitimate chemical products.” Pesticides are the key
elements in the chemical agent arena. In fact, the general pesticide chemical
formula (organophosphate) is the “grandfather” of modern day nerve agents.
Pesticides are also precursors of many other chemical weapons including
Mustard-Lewisite (HL), Phosgene (CG) a choking agent, and Hydrogen Cyanide (AC)
a blood agent.
It was not surprising then, as Coalition forces attacked into Iraq, that huge
warehouses and caches of “commercial and agricultural” chemicals were
seized and painstakingly tested by Army and Marine chemical specialists. What
was surprising was how quickly the ISG refuted the findings of our ground
forces, and how silent they have been on the significance of these caches.
US forces participating in Operation Iraqi Freedom had the latest chemical
detection gear, including chemical detection paper, chemical agent detector
kits, improved chemical agent monitors, and sophisticated Fox Chemical Recon
Vehicles. Some American GIs remembered well the shortfalls of this equipment
in Gulf War I. Now all of these older devices had been improved, and new and
more accurate devices had been issued. In fact, some mobile Army labs had
highly sensitive mass spectrometers to test for suspicious substances. Who
could argue the results of repeated tests using these devices without
explaining how DoD had apparently been ripped off by contractors for faulty
products? Apparently, the ISG could and did.
One of the reported incidents occurred near Karbala where there appeared to be
a very large “agricultural supply” area of 55-gallon drums of pesticide.
In addition, there was also a camouflaged bunker complex full of these drums
that some people entered with unpleasant results. More than a dozen soldiers,
a Knight-Ridder reporter, a CNN cameraman, and two Iraqi POWs came down with
symptoms consistent with exposure to nerve agent. A full day of tests on the
drums resulted in one positive for nerve agent, and then one resulted in a
negative. Later, an Army Fox NBC [nuclear, biological, chemical] Recon Vehicle
confirmed the existence of Sarin. An officer from the 63d Chemical Company
thought there might well be chemical weapons at the site.
But later ISG tests resulted in a proclamation of negative, end of story,
nothing to see here, etc., and the earlier findings and injuries dissolved into
non-existence. Left unexplained is the small matter of the obvious pains taken
to disguise the cache of ostensibly legitimate pesticides. One wonders about
the advantage an agricultural commodities business gains by securing drums of
pesticide in camouflaged bunkers six feet underground. The “agricultural
site” was also co-located with a military ammunition dump, evidently nothing
more than a coincidence in the eyes of the ISG.
Another find occurred around the northern Iraqi town of Bai’ji, where
elements of the 4th Infantry Division (Mech) discovered 55-gallon drums of a
substance that mass spectrometer testing confirmed was cyclosarin and an
unspecified blister agent. A mobile laboratory was also found nearby that
could have been used to mix chemicals at the site. And only yards away,
surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles, as well as gas masks were
found. Of course, later tests by the experts revealed that these were only the
ubiquitous pesticides that everybody was turning up. It seems that Iraqi
soldiers were obsessed with keeping their ammo dumps insect-free, according to
the reading of the evidence now enshrined by the conventional wisdom that “no
WMD stockpiles have been discovered.”
Coalition forces continued to find evidence of CW after major combat operations
had concluded. The US unit around Taji, just north of Baghdad discovered
pesticides in one of the largest ammo dumps in Iraq. The unit wanted to use the
ammo dump for their own operations, when they discovered the pesticides in
“non-standard” drums that were smaller in diameter but much longer than the
standard 55-gallon drums.
Then in January of this year, Danish forces discovered 120mm mortar shells with
a mysterious liquid inside that initially tested positive for blister agents.
Further tests in Southern Iraq and in the US were, of course, negative. The
Danish Army said, “It is unclear why the initial field tests were wrong.”
This is the understatement of the year, and also points to a most basic
question: If it wasn’t a chemical agent, what was it? More pesticides?
Dishwashing detergent? From this old soldier’s perspective, I gain nothing
from putting a liquid in my mortar rounds unless that stuff will do bad things
to the enemy.
Virtually all agencies concerned with Iraq’s WMD programs have reached the
conclusion that Saddam was an expert at delay, dispersion, and deception. His
nuclear program had restarted as reported earlier this year by Dr. Kay, the
previous head of the ISG. Also, “seed agents” and other bio-toxins had
been dispersed throughout Baghdad and Iraq to form the basis for the
regeneration of a full-fledged BW program. This modus operandi was no
different for the regeneration of Saddam’s chemical weapons program.
Operating under the guise of legitimate industrial and agricultural chemical
production and storage, Iraq would have gone into full-scale conversion of its
stockpile of chemical precursors into weaponized agents, had the Coalition not
attacked and seized Iraq.
What is stunning is that the ISG seems incapable of connecting the dots to
present to the American people the clear evidence of Saddam’s flouting of 12
years of UN resolutions, and the grave consequences if we had failed to act.
The ISG also owes a detailed explanation to DoD as to how 12 years of research,
development, and money has apparently gone down the drain in the effort to
upgrade the military’s chemical detection capability and NBC training
regimen. That the ISG can consistently contradict other technical specialists,
while ignoring years of UNSCOM and US intelligence assessments, without
accountability is unconscionable, and must be rectified as soon as possible.
Douglas Hanson was a US Army cavalry reconnaissance officer for 20 years, and
is a Gulf War I combat veteran. He was an Atomic Demolitions Munitions (ADM)
Security Officer, and a Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense Officer. As
a civilian analyst, he has worked on stability and support operations in
Bosnia, and was initially an operations officer in the operations/intelligence
cell of the Requirements Coordination Office of the CPA in Baghdad. He was
later assigned as the Chief of Staff of the Ministry of Science and Technology.
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| User: "PETRA TJRNLUND" |
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| Title: Re: Why did Iraq need insect free Ammo dumps? |
08 Apr 2004 02:26:37 PM |
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"TonyZ2001" <tonyz2001@aol.com> skrev i meddelandet
news:20040408051102.10482.00000001@mb-m12.aol.com...
No WMD's In Iraq?
By Douglas Hanson
AmericanThinker.com | April 7, 2004
It has become established conventional wisdom that "no stockpiles of WMD
have
been discovered in Iraq." But this reading of the evidence uncovered to
date
is premature at best, and highly questionable. A closer look at the data,
and
at the uses made of it, is essential for those who wish to understand the
genuine state of Iraq's WMD threat at the time of Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Hey pantyboy there is no WMD in Iraq. Your monkey president and his cronies
lied to you about it. His lies have caused the deaths of at least 600 young
American servicemen and women, scores of you british servicemen a few
others...and tens of thousands of Iraqi's.
So stop clutching at straws...admit it. Vote against dubya next election and
show us all in the rest of the world that you're not a fuckin total
imbecile!
There's a good boy then.
WH
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| User: "Woodswun" |
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| Title: Re: Why did Iraq need insect free Ammo dumps? |
08 Apr 2004 07:17:14 PM |
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In article <20040408051102.10482.00000001@mb-m12.aol.com>, (TonyZ2001) wrote:
What did we expect to find in Iraq, the equivalent of the Pantex Plant? In
fact, we did find hundreds of metric tons of yellowcake and low-enriched
uranium. But I digress.
What people expected to find was the WMDs that were an "imminent threat" to the
US. To a much lesser extent, people were interested in any additional WMDs that
Iraq may have had, but the reason for the war was to save ourselves from almost
certain attack by at-the-ready WMDs. Since *NO* WMDs have yet been found, it's
quite obvious that there was no imminent threat, as they could not have been
at-the-ready and at the same time have been so well-concealed that absolutely no
physical evidence was found within the first 3 months. Indeed, everyone
*assumed* Iraq had some WMDs, but since Iraq had its hands tied somewhat, it
entered nobody's head to enter into the risks of war over them. Now, a year
later, there is doubt that Iraq actually even had any WMDs at all.
Woods
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| User: "Jean Guernon" |
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| Title: Re: Why did Iraq need insect free Ammo dumps? |
08 Apr 2004 08:08:04 PM |
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Woodswun a crit:
In article <20040408051102.10482.00000001@mb-m12.aol.com>, (TonyZ2001) wrote:
What did we expect to find in Iraq, the equivalent of the Pantex Plant? In
fact, we did find hundreds of metric tons of yellowcake and low-enriched
uranium. But I digress.
What people expected to find was the WMDs that were an "imminent threat" to the
US. To a much lesser extent, people were interested in any additional WMDs that
Iraq may have had, but the reason for the war was to save ourselves from almost
certain attack by at-the-ready WMDs.
*****, the only reason for war was to implement 1441.
Nothing else.
J.
Since *NO* WMDs have yet been found, it's
quite obvious that there was no imminent threat, as they could not have been
at-the-ready and at the same time have been so well-concealed that absolutely no
physical evidence was found within the first 3 months. Indeed, everyone
*assumed* Iraq had some WMDs, but since Iraq had its hands tied somewhat, it
entered nobody's head to enter into the risks of war over them. Now, a year
later, there is doubt that Iraq actually even had any WMDs at all.
Woods
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| User: "Woodswun" |
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| Title: Re: Why did Iraq need insect free Ammo dumps? |
09 Apr 2004 04:50:30 PM |
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In article <UHmdc.12732810$Of.2125950@news.easynews.com>, Jean Guernon <jguernon@globetrotter.net> wrote:
Woodswun a crit:
In article <20040408051102.10482.00000001@mb-m12.aol.com>,
(TonyZ2001) wrote:
What did we expect to find in Iraq, the equivalent of the Pantex Plant? In
fact, we did find hundreds of metric tons of yellowcake and low-enriched
uranium. But I digress.
What people expected to find was the WMDs that were an "imminent threat" to
the
US. To a much lesser extent, people were interested in any additional WMDs
that
Iraq may have had, but the reason for the war was to save ourselves from
almost
certain attack by at-the-ready WMDs.
*****, the only reason for war was to implement 1441.
Is that how Bush got the UN and Congress to agree to invade Iraq? No, it was
not.
Nothing else.
Oh, there was plenty "else"!
Woods
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| User: "Jean Guernon" |
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| Title: Re: Why did Iraq need insect free Ammo dumps? |
11 Apr 2004 01:11:01 AM |
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Woodswun a crit:
In article <UHmdc.12732810$Of.2125950@news.easynews.com>, Jean Guernon <jguernon@globetrotter.net> wrote:
Woodswun a crit:
In article <20040408051102.10482.00000001@mb-m12.aol.com>,
(TonyZ2001) wrote:
What did we expect to find in Iraq, the equivalent of the Pantex Plant? In
fact, we did find hundreds of metric tons of yellowcake and low-enriched
uranium. But I digress.
What people expected to find was the WMDs that were an "imminent threat" to
the
US. To a much lesser extent, people were interested in any additional WMDs
that
Iraq may have had, but the reason for the war was to save ourselves from
almost
certain attack by at-the-ready WMDs.
*****, the only reason for war was to implement 1441.
Is that how Bush got the UN and Congress to agree to invade Iraq? No, it was
not.
Yes it was. We have discussed that a lot in the past and I have always shown you
that the prime reasons was the UN resolutions. This is how it is formulated,
this is how it was discussed, there was nothing else to do the way it is
written, lest the UN became totally irrelevant.
Now the implication of making the resolution in the first place, indeed is
because Iraq was a threat to the world; it had the lifting of a cease fire
against it hanging over its head, the only ones with that, if it did not meet
the conditions they had to abide by. These conditions were to make this very
threat go away. It didn't work. They didn't abide by them. They were that kind
of threat to the world, nobody knew how imminent it was, and they still don't
know, and won't know until they find out what happened with the WMD.
What they know now, is that indeed there would have been WMD back in action the
day the UN left, these intentions are known, these programs are known. The rest
remains to be scrutinized.
Nothing else.
Oh, there was plenty "else"!
Woods
The fact that Saddam didn't say anything about the anthrax until one day before
the invasion is by itself a threat.
It doesn't matter that he destroyed it the day before he talked about it or
years before, he threatened with it until the last day, despite the threat of
war in all UN resolutions, and we know he certainly maintained the programs to
materialize these threats on a whim, if ever he didn't hide the poisons or
shipped it to its neighbors, if ever he had destroyed it earlier than the last
day, if ever. Nobody in the world knew about his WMD but that he was probably an
imminent threat.
The main reason for getting there is him breaking all the other conditions about
Kuwait (POW, Belonging like Archives so as to take over, and threats of invasion
all broken again after 1441) and about international terrorism (broken too by
paying for palestinians homicide terrorists).
As I showed, until the last day he as in breach for at least one substance. But
this was just adding to the the imminence of the threat. The important is that
the UN resolution signed by all the Security Council was to be implemented the
moment he broke any of the condition of 687e, no matter which, unless it was a
condition about WMD, then it was the responsibility of Blix to convene the
council and discuss the possibility of acting. What did he do? Nothing. well he
reported it. Blix was with the Germans to try to avoid implementing the
resolution. he wouldn't call on the council. We got to know what happened to the
anthrax only one day before the invasion. I remind you, it was because he broke
other parts of the resolution, it was unavoidable, despite the obstruction of Blix.
But anyway, you need to grasp at least this, this concept of threat to the world
was that of the UN resolution.
No UN resolution threaten force unless it is a matter of threat to the world.
Is there any other resolution in the last 20 years, besides the one about
Afghanistan, that threatened force?
Nope.
There is a reason for that, and they tried to explain that. As I have shown you
again and again, there is always a basis of the implementation the UN resolution
in their explanations.
This is what the problem of the US is, they try to reason by explaining what
this means. They should have stuck to the letter of the resolution. Maybe be
explicit about the implication of not implementing the resolutions, which is
what they were doing in fact, but not saying it was that. Show that no one but
the allies of kuwait had a word to say on its implementation once he had
blatantly broken four resolutions not related to WMD, as the resolutions
stipulated. But they try to explain it with their heart instead of their brain
to the masses, with the WMD rhetoric's, despite the non-cooperation of Blix, to
name one. Still always relating it to the letter of the resolution.
Of course, and I have always said that, they should have insisted strictly about
the importance of implementing the UN resolution and not try to explain how not
implementing 'it' impacted the world.
Not as if the US was singly targeted and threatened, even though it was by
Saddam and his sons. Uday was the least subtle and, like Kim Jong Il, did
threatened to make the street of the US lakes of fire. But this is not enough by
itself to go get them. Otherwise we would be in North Korea the Us would have
landed.
The thing is the UN authorization. Sure, the US can do without UN sanction if
needs be, but if need had been such, if what they sold to the US was not the UN
non implementation implication as a real threat, but an actual solid real WMD
threat, they would have gone against NK first, as they knew that, out of both
threat, only Iraq didn't have nukes yet, if they knew anything. But they also
knew it could be a matter of 6 months. Especially after hey seized a huge amount
of plutonium at the frontier to Iraq a couple of months before. Anyway. No, only
the UN resolution motivated them, and justly so.
J.
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